This essay is an analysis of the implications of misperception-the inaccurate assessment by one actor of the other actor's preferences-in international relations. The author finds that misperception cannot affect the choice of an actor with a dominant strategy, although it can affect that actor's expectations as long as both actors are self-interested and seek to maximize their own payoffs. Misperception creates conflict only in a narrowly circumscribed range of situations, and even then the misperceived actor has no incentive to mask its true preferences. An actor who deceives does so in order to facilitate coordination through the other's misperception of its preferences, and thus to avoid conflict-not to create it. Three possible outcomes can occur when both actors misperceive, and in only one of the three does misperception cause conflict that would otherwise be avoidable. In a formal analysis of the limited set of situations that characterize international crises, misperception is found neither to create conflict nor to lead to the escalation of crisis into war.
INTRODUCTION
THE importance of misperception as a cause of international conflict, especially war, is commonly accepted. Whether as a primary determinant or a residual one, misperception has been linked with most 20th-century wars, including both world wars and the cold war.' Its importance has been emphasized by general work on the role of cognitive processes and by analyses of decision making in the study of foreign policy; yet a theory of misperception remains to be formulated. The most definitive work on the subject, by Robert Jervis, presents a categorization of types of misperception and provides illustrations for each.2 But the final chapter of the book is entitled "In Lieu of Conclusions," and we still do not know what misperceptions occur, under what conditions, and with what consequences. All too often, the mere occurrence of misperception is taken as prima facie evidence that it affected the misperceiving actor's decision, and thus the outcome itself. Moreover, it is universally suggested that the result of misperception is conflict that would otherwise have been avoidable. Although international conflicts are often attributed to misperception, international cooperation never is. This paper is a first step toward a theory of misperception. The focus here, as it is in most of the literature, is on one actor's misperception of another's intentions rather than on the misperception of capability. The conclusions suggest that misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome; that, when mispercep-tion does have such effects, it is in a narrow range of circumstances; and that misperception can lead to cooperation as well as to conflict. Further, the paper elucidates the assumptions about international relations that are implicit in any emphasis on the role of misperception in international politics.
CHOICES, INTERESTS, EXPECTATIONS, AND MISPERCEPTIONS
The importance of misperception would be evident if states were not self-interested actors but were, for example, altruists. If an actor chooses a course of action that is based on its presumed effect on others, then misperception can be important. One cannot be a successful altruist if one does not know the preferences of others. But if states in the international arena are self-interested individualists concerned with maximizing their own returns, then misperception matters only under certain circumstances.
Further, misperception can only matter in relations between interdependent states. If states are independent of one another-in the sense that one actor's decisions do not affect another actor's payoffs-then misperception is irrelevant. To borrow the analogy often used by international systems theorists, misperception is irrelevant if world politics approximates a competitive market in which states act as firms. In such a world, the decisions of one actor do not affect the payoffs of others, and an assessment of the intentions of others is unnecessary.3 If, however, world politics revolves primarily around a few major powers and approximates an oligopolistic market with imperfect competition, then the actors can be seen as interdependent in the sense that the actions of any state affect those of others.
Finally, the belief that misperception is important necessarily implies that international politics is a variable-sum game. In any constant-sum game, an actor can determine another's preference ordering simply by recognizing the game as constant-sum and knowing its own preferences.4 If the two actors' payoffs add up to the same constant in each of 3 In a competitive market, an actor may misperceive the market and the nature of supply and demand conditions. But this does not involve misperception of any individual actor's intentions. The market analogy is prevalent in the works of Waltz and Kaplan: see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, I979); Morton A. Kaplan, Towards Professionalism in International Theory: Macrosystem Analysis (New York: Free Press, I979).
4If an actor knows not only its own preferences and the fact that it is in a constant-sum game but recognizes the game as zero-sum, then it can determine not only the other's preferences but its actual utilities as well. the four possible outcomes, then one actor's worst outcome must be the other's best, and so on. In other words, misperception, the incorrect assessment of another's preferences, cannot occur in situations of pure conflict in which one actor's gain comes at another's expense. Misperception cannot matter in such situations; it can only matter in relationships that combine elements of cooperation and conflict.
The argument that misperception affects an actor's decision presumes that the actor has a choice. Some maintain that actors do not always see that they have a choice, and misperceive others to have a wider latitude.5 Indeed, national leaders may not have choices because of structural or systemic constraints, or because of their own cognitive processes. But if they see themselves as having only a single course of action, then their assessment of the intentions and preferences of others is moot, and their belief that others have alternative choices affects only their expectations. There is no reason to argue that they would have acted differently had they perceived others accurately.
Misperception need not affect the decision of an interdependent actor who does have a choice, even when it affects that actor's expectations. It would not, for example, affect the behavior of any actor with a "dominant strategy"-a course of action that maximizes its returns no matter what others do. Such an actor need not know or care about the preferences of others; at most, an inaccurate assessment (misperception) of another's preferences will affect its expectations.
The American-Japanese crisis of I940-I94I illustrates the effect of misperception on expectations. In a study of this and other crises, Snyder and Diesing follow the convention of dichotomizing the choices of states as cooperation/concession and defection/standing firm.6 Figure i illustrates the interaction between two states with those two choices, an interaction that will result in one of four different outcomes: either both actors cooperate (CC), both defect (DD), or one defects while the other cooperates (CD and DC).
Snyder and Diesing designate the American-Japanese crisis of I940-I94I as a game of "deadlock" (Figure 2 ), in which both the Japanese and the Americans had dominant strategies-courses of action that they preferred no matter what the other intended to do. In addition, both The cell labels CC, DC, CD, and DD are derived from the individual strategies that combine to create that outcome. The DC outcome, for example, results from A's choosing D while B chooses C. most preferred to stand firm while the other capitulated. Next, each preferred war (both standing firm); then, mutual compromise. The least desirable outcome for each was to capitulate while the other did not. The outcome that emerged from their independent choices, made in line with their dominant strategies of standing firm, was mutual defection. This outcome was an "equilibrium" one-that is, an outcome from which no individual actor can shift-unilaterally without making itself worse off. This distinction-that misperception can lead an actor with a dominant strategy to expect an outcome that is different from the actual one without affecting its course of action'-is an important one, especially in view of the recent interest in strategic surprise. Evidence of surprise, or of inaccurate expectations, cannot be used to infer that an actor would have acted differently if it had perceived the other's intentions accurately. Many examples of strategic surprise are cases in which the actors were clearly enemies, and in which the surprised state was supposedly vigilant in its continual assessment of its opponent. That it was, in fact, surprised is only evidence that misperception affected its expectations. One certainly would not conclude that it was 7 This analysis provides an interesting perspective on the question of whether President Roosevelt acted to bring on the war with Japan. It is not accurate to suggest that he wanted war, for the most preferred outcome was Japanese capitulation to American demands. On the other hand, he did prefer war to either compromise or capitulation by the United States, and understood that the American commitment to standing firm made war a possible outcome. In view of his belief that Japan would capitulate, Roosevelt did not expect war to be the outcome, but he did intend to stand firm, the possibility of war notwithstanding. An interesting revisionist challenge might then be the following: Roosevelt did not misperceive Japanese preferences, recognized the game to be "deadlock," and knew that war was coming. Although he continued to stand firm by American demands, he did not actively prepare for war because he did not want to be accused of wanting war or of bringing it about. He thus pretended to expect Japanese concessions, knowing full well that, given the context, war was inevitable.
8 Misperception need not even affect an actor's expectations. An actor can assess the actual preference ordering inaccurately and still perceive another's dominant strategy accurately.
misperception that led to a conflict which would otherwise have been avoidable.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in i979 provides a recent illustration. By all accounts, the Soviets were quite understandably surprised by the American reaction. Although they did not expect plaudits from the West, they did not foresee the depth and intensity of America's response. This surprise can be taken as evidence of misperception on the part of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, one cannot conclude that it would not have invaded if it had forecast the American reaction accurately. The decision to invade was almost certainly not contingent on an assessment of the likely Western response. Rather, the nature of regional politics apparently dictated the Soviet decision. Again, surprise can be taken as evidence that misperception affected expectations, but not that it affected choice.
MISPERCEPTION AND CONTINGENCY
Misperception can only affect the choice of an actor whose decision is contingent on the actions of others.9 By crudely dichotomizing foreign policy choices into cooperation and defection, we can delineate two possible contingent strategies. An actor may be a "reciprocator" -prepared to cooperate if others cooperate, and prepared to stand firm if others fail to bend. Alternatively, the actor may be an "opportunist" -prepared to stand firm if others cooperate, but prepared to cooperate if they stand firm. Each must assess the preferences and intentions of others because they are central to its own decision; its misperception may be one of two kinds: either that the other has a dominant strategy when it actually does not, or that the other has a contingent strategy when it actually does not.
When neither actor has a dominant strategy, there are four possible outcomes (see Figure 3 ): both actors reciprocate, neither actor reciprocates, one actor reciprocates while the other does not, and vice versa. In a world of mutual reciprocity (a "tit-for-tat" world), each party is prepared to respond in kind to the actions it expects the other to take, cooperating when the other cooperates and responding to defection 9 Steven J. Brams, "Deception in 2 X 2 Games," Journal of Peace Science, ii (Spring I977), I7I-203, analyzes the situations in which actors have an incentive to deceive others. One cannot simply call misperception the flip side of deception, however, and presume that situations in which the outcome is affected by deception constitute the universe of situations in which misperception affects the outcome. After all, misperception can occur even when the misperceived actor has no incentive to deceive. Moreover, the present paper is specifically concerned with assessing the implications of misperception for international conflict and cooperation, and the conclusions suggest that situations in which actors have an incentive to deceive are not the ones in which misperception results in otherwise avoidable conflict.
with defection. In a nonreciprocal world (one exemplified by the game of "chicken"), neither actor is prepared to respond in kind to the other (each will cooperate when it expects the other to defect and will defect when it believes the other will cooperate); reciprocal situations are similarly characterized by no-conflict or two-equilibria games. Situations in which one actor reciprocates and the other does not are always games without equilibrium outcomes. cooperates)
The The implications of an actor's erroneous belief that the other actor has a dominant strategy are detailed in Figure 3 . In only two of these cases can misperception result in unnecessary war, a DD outcome that would not have occurred had the actors accurately perceived one another's intentions. One of them occurs when the misperceiving actor is a reciprocator who mistakenly believes that the other has a dominant strategy of defection when, in fact, it too is prepared to reciprocate. It is exemplified by the vigilant status-quo state that believes another status-quo state to be an aggressor. In the second case of misperception that results in otherwise avoidable mutual defection, the misper-ceiver is an opportunist who believes the other actor to have a dominant strategy of cooperation. War results because the misperceiving actor cheats on an opponent believed certain to capitulate but actually willing to reciprocate. For instance, prior to World War I, Germany was perhaps an opportunitist in assessing British preferences in July 1914. Germany might have been deterred had it seen that Britain was prepared to reciprocate, but Germany's misperception of Britain as a cooperator led to an otherwise avoidable war. Other examples of misperceptionsuch as the North's invasion of South Korea in 1950 and the Soviet decision to place missiles in Cuba-typically fall into this category of an opportunist's misperceiving a reciprocator as a cooperator.
In these cases, deterrence fails because the misperceiving opportunist incorrectly sees a reciprocator as a cooperator. The misperception causes an otherwise deterrable, and thus avoidable, conflict. But the previous deduction-that avoidable war is a result of a reciprocator's misperception of another reciprocator as a defector-suggests that deterrence can also fail because of misperceived hardness, and not just because of misperceived softness. In both cases, the misperceived actor is a reciprocator. When the misperceived actor is an opportunist, misperception does not lead to the DD outcome.
In these two cases, in which both actors have contingent strategies but one believes the other to have a dominant strategy, neither the misperceiving actor nor the misperceived one is likely to welcome the occurrence of a misperception that leads to mutual defection-not, that is, unless they most prefer to go to war. The misperceiving actor knows that its decision is contingent on what the other actor does. It thus needs to know what the other will do, but has no reason to hide its own preferences. Similarly, the misperceived actor, prepared to respond in kind to both cooperation and defection, has no incentive to mask its true preferences. Such a reciprocator does not wish to be seen as a capitulator by an opportunist, and, if it does not want war, it does not wish to be seen as an aggressor by another reciprocator.
It is important to note that one actor's misperception of another as having a dominant strategy can also facilitate the avoidance of war and mutual defection. If an actor inappropriately believes that the other has a dominant strategy when it really does not, the misperceiving actor has a cue as to how it should behave. The misperception transforms a fluid situation in which there is either no equilibrium outcome or two equilibria into one with a single equilibrium; it provides a clear course of action for a misperceiver with a contingent strategy. It can facilitate cooperation-for example, when a reciprocator misperceives another reciprocator as a cooperator. The potential outcome of mutual defection is avoided and the misperception facilitates the occurrence of the outcome of mutual cooperation.
The belief that an actor has a dominant strategy when it actually has a contingent one can also assure the avoidance of war by leading the misperceiver to capitulate. When an opportunist wrongly perceives another nonreciprocator to be bent on defection, its misperception ensures the certain avoidance of mutual defection by frightening it into cooperating. In such situations, the misperceived actor has some incentive to mask its true preferences in order to induce the other to capitulate. In a game of "chicken," for example, an actor has an incentive to mask its true preferences: to appear to have a dominant strategy of defection. In Figure 4 , the actual game is "chicken," but actor B's misperception of the situation as "called bluff" leads it to cooperate because it believes A's dominant strategy to be defection. The misperception facilitates coordination since it leads B to cooperate and accept the equilibrium outcome in which it does not receive its best possible payoff. An accurate perception might have led B to expect the DC outcome and defect, or to signal its opponent that it would cooperate and thus expect the CC payoff. Understanding the true nature of the situation would lead B to do everything possible to avoid the CD outcome, but misperception facilitates coordination and leads B to accept the equilibrium outcome in which it gets its third-best payoff. In other words, misperception makes B into an unknowing altruist. This situation is one in which actor A has an incentive to deceive B about its true preferences and so to induce B's charitable behavior. The resolution of the Cuban missile crisis may be an example of such a situation. The Russians were certainly opportunists who cheated by placing missiles in Cuba on the assumption that the United States would capitulate and accept their presence; the Soviets were also prepared to withdraw the missiles if they believed at any point that the United States was prepared to launch an air strike. If we assume that the United States was similarly opportunist and not truly prepared to go to war, then what frightened the Soviets into backing down was their misperception of the United States as bent on standing firm. Such a misperception transformed a game of "chicken" into one of "called bluff." Deception facilitates the avoidance of conflict rather than exacerbates the possibility of its occurrence. In this case, the United States had an incentive to deceive the Soviets, and the Soviet misperception facilitated de-escalation and the avoidance of greater conflict.
MISPERCEIVING
A CONTINGENT STRATEGY
The other major misperception for an actor without a dominant strategy is to assume that the other actor is also without a dominant strategy (see Figure 5 ). Here too, misperception can either lead to conflict or facilitate cooperation. The situation is transformed from one in which the misperceiver has a clear course of action because it knows the other's dominant strategy into one where it is uncertain. The misperception is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for causing conflict or facilitating cooperation. This occurs, for example, when the misperceived actor has a dominant strategy of defection and the misperceiving actor is a nonreciprocator. An accurate assessment by actor A in Figure 6 would lead to CD as the equilibrium outcome. Actor A's misperception, however, leads it to believe that DC is also an equilibrium outcome that can be achieved by A's convincing B that it will defect, thus forcing B to cooperate. Actor A's misperception can result in a DD outcome. In this case, the misperception does indeed affect the decision of the misperceiving actor and exacerbates the inherent conflict. It is not, however, the sole cause of the otherwise avoidable mutual defection; rather, the outcome is a result of the combination of the misperception and the opportunist's obstinacy.
This analysis of misperception suggests a number of important conclusions. First, misperception can affect an actor's choice only when that actor's decision is contingent on the behavior of the other actor: misperception is irrelevant for an actor with a dominant strategy. Second, despite the fact that misperception can affect an actor's choice, it need not necessarily lead to an undesired war (a non-equilibrium DD ); it can also facilitate cooperation and prevent conflict. Moreover, misperception can cause conflict only if the misperceived actor has either a dominant strategy of defection or a contingent strategy of reciprocity. Third, in those cases in which misperception can cause conflict, the misperceived actor has no desire to mask its true preferences. When one actor does, in fact, wish to hide its true preferences, such a successful deception actually facilitates coordination and the avoidance of conflict.
MISPERCEPTION AND SEQUENTIAL CHOICE
The foregoing analysis does not specify whether the actors choose simultaneously or sequentially. A criticism often made of gametheoretic work is that it presumes simultaneous choice, and thus fails to capture the dynamic nature of international relations, which do not occur in a historical vacuum but in an ongoing context of action and reaction. Yet if international politics is indeed a dynamic sequence of actions and reactions, it becomes more difficult to argue that misperception is important in determining international outcomes. If misperception can only affect the decision of an actor whose choice is contingent on another's, then one must add more assumptions to make a case for the importance of misperception in a world of sequential decisions. After all, when an actor with a contingent strategy is responding to another's actions, it already knows how the other has acted. An actor with a contingent choice simply takes its cue from the immediately preceding behavior of the other.
For misperception to matter in a world of sequential decisions, the misperceiving actor's choice must be contingent on the other actor's /fautre behavior-on how the other will respond to its current choice. Moreover, one has also to add the assumption that the other's future choice will differ from its previous behavior. In other words, two assumptions must be added if one wants to argue that misperception matters in a world of sequential decisions: that the misperceiver's decision is contingent on the other's future choice, and that the other's future preferences will differ from those reflected in its past choices. Given these two additional assumptions, the previous analysis of the situations in which misperception matters can be generalized. It is argued above, for example, that a reciprocator's misperception of another reciprocator as a cooperator leads to the avoidance of conflict. An example is perhaps provided by Neville Chamberlain's dealings with Germany in 1938. By the end of the Munich crisis, Chamberlain clearly knew Hitler's intentions regarding Czechoslovakia, but Chamberlain's decision as to what to do was contingent on his expectations of Hitler's future be-havior. Chamberlain was by then ready to reciprocate future German defection or cooperation, but can be said to have been uncertain about Hitler's future preferences. His misperception was to believe Hitler's assurances that these were his last demands. Chamberlain did not extrapolate from Hitler's past and current behavior; he made his contingent decision in 1938 based on his mistaken belief that Hitler would be a cooperator in the future.
The argument about the importance of misperception in the Soviet decision to deploy missiles in Cuba must also include these additional assumptions if it is to place the Soviet decision in a broader context that includes action and reaction. The Soviets were opportunists whose decision was contingent on their calculation of the likely American response to their action. Their mistake was to extrapolate from American behavior during the Berlin wall crisis, and thus expect the United States to cooperate and accept Soviet missiles in Cuba. In the Berlin crisis, however, the United States had had a dominant strategy of cooperation, whereas in the missile crisis it had a contingent strategy that led it to respond not by capitulating, but by standing firm.
To repeat: the above deductions of the situations in which misperception matters can be generalized to a world of action and reaction with the addition of two assumptions. These are that the misperceiving actor's choice is contingent on its expectations of the other's subsequent and future behavior, and that the other's preferences are different from those reflected in its past actions.
This change in the misperceived actor's preferences often lies at the root of the misuse of history. Incorrect historical lessons are often inappropriate extrapolations of others' preferences and behavior.10 The historical interpretations may be, and indeed usually are, correct. A problem arises only when the misperceived actor's preferences change from what they have been in the past. Even so, the misperception that results from such inappropriate extrapolation matters only when the misperceiver's decision is contingent on its expectations of the other's subsequent response. MISPERCEPTION 
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The foregoing conclusions, derived from an analysis of all possible games, are obviously applicable to any subset that best exemplifies realworld situations." In a major and wide-ranging empirical study of 10 Cf. Jervis (fn. 2), 2I7-82; Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, '973).
11 Anatol Rapoport and Melvin J. Guyer, "A Taxonomy of 2 X 2 Games," General Systems, xi (i966), 203-I4, enumerate the 78 unique 2 X 2 games. Most do not have labels and probably not all have real-world equivalents. crisis dynamics, Snyder and Diesing find that all of the historical events they analyze can be represented by nine games (Figure 7) . Some of the nine are familiar ones that already have well-known labels: prisoners' dilemma, chicken, hero, and leader. The five other games they find to represent common real-world occurrences are those they call deadlock, called blut, protector, bully, and big bully. They argue that some of these games (hero, leader, and protector) characterize the relationships of allies, and that others (bully, big bully, and Snyder and Diesing provide numerous historical examples of misperception in both kinds of relationships. Their discussion of misperception is derived from their analysis of these historical cases, but it is also possible to assess the impact of misperception through the formal analysis of the nine games that, according to their argument, characterize international crises. Assuming that Snyder and Diesing's nine games constitute the universe of crisis situations, the implications of misperception can be assessed by separately analyzing the preference orderings of one actor (the row player, A) for all of these games (see Figure 8) .12 Actor A's preferences clearly define five of the nine situations in which it need not bother to assess B's preferences-much less assess them accurately-as long as it knows its own. When A knows, for example, that it prefers the outcome DC to CC to CD to DD, then the game must be chicken. Moreover, if A knows its own preferences and knows that these nine games constitute the universe of situations, it can sometimes deduce B's exact order of preference.
In the other four games, however, A's preferences alone do not define the game. Thus, A must accurately perceive B's preferences in order to know what the game actually is. Otherwise, A might confuse bully and deadlock, two games in which its preference orderings are the same. Similarly, A might confuse prisoners' dilemma with called bluf. Even in these four situations, misperception does not affect A's behavior or, therefore, the game's outcome. In both bully and deadlock, A prefers to defect regardless of B's actions. Mistaking one game for the other will lead A to expect the wrong equilibrium outcome (DC in bully, DD in deadlock), but will not change A's course of action. Since actor A also has the same dominant strategy in both prisoners' dilemma and called blufi, misperception again will cause A to expect the wrong outcome but will not lead it to change its behavior.
Thus, misperception cannot affect the behavior of the row player (actor A) in any of the nine games found by Snyder and Diesing to characterize international crises. There are five games that A cannot 12The analysis that follows assumes that actors know that these games constitute the universe of crisis situations. Although Snyder and Diesing's (fn. 6) argument-that the universe of crisis situations they analyze reduces to these nine games-is convincing, there may, of course, be other games that capture the essence of situations which occur in international relations. Nevertheless, many preference orderings are nonsensical when applied to international politics; thus, decision makers may implicitly understand that the universe of possible situations is limited. possibly mistake for one of the others. In the rest, misperception may lead A to mistake one game for another and thus expect the wrong outcome; but in each of these cases, A has a dominant strategy, and its course of action remains the same regardless of B's intentions.
For actor B, life is not quite as simple, since its preference orderings define just three of the nine games unambiguously (see Figure 9) . Only in deadlock, prisoners' dilemma, and hero are B's preferences enough to let B know what game it is playing. On the other hand, actor B's preference orderings are identical in called bluf, bully, big bully, and chicken, and B must accurately perceive A's preference ordering to know what the situation is. Similarly, actor B's preference orderings are the same in protector as in leader, and here too, a knowledge of A's preference ordering is necessary for B to know the true context. Actor B's misperception of A's preferences, and its possible confusion of called blu#, bully, big bully, and chicken, is more of a problem for it than is A's similar confusion of bully with deadlock and prisoners' dilemma with called bluff, for B does not have a dominant strategy in any of these four games. Yet, because actor A does have a dominant strategy (D) in three of the four (called bluf, bully, and big bully), B's behavior is not affected by its mistaking any of these three for one of the other two. B is forced to cooperate with A in these games, and the equilibrium outcome is always DC. B's error does not affect the game's solution.
If, however, B believes chicken to be one of the other three games, its misperception may affect its behavior and the game's outcome as well. If B believes the game to be either called bluf, bully, or big bully, it will automatically cooperate with A rather than stand firm (which would have produced its most preferred outcome by forcing A to back down). In other words, B makes the error of believing it is weaker because it mistakenly assumes A to have a dominant strategy.
Yet, even when B's behavior is affected by its confusion of chicken with one of these other games, the outcome may not be affected. The outcome changes only when B happens to be the actor who would not have backed down first had both parties correctly understood the game to be chicken. There are two equilibrium solutions to the game of chicken, CD and DC, as well as the natural outcome, CC. Actor B's misperception guarantees the DC outcome, which is to actor A's advantage. The DD outcome is also a possible (albeit unlikely) outcome to the game of chicken, however; B's misperception, by forcing B to cooperate, thus insures that they avoid the disastrous DD outcome.
Another possible misperception is B's belief that called bluff, bully, or big bully is actually chicken. Here, the problem is the opposite of the one discussed above. Actor B does not recognize that A has a dominant strategy of defection that requires B to cooperate. B's accurate assessment of the situation would lead to a DC outcome, one of two possible equilibrium outcomes in the game of chicken (the other is CD). B's error affects the outcome only if B insists on defecting since it expects that A will cooperate. In this case, CD would be the result. Actor A's dominant strategy, however, is to defect. Even if the misperception is sustained, the end result should be the same, for in chicken, B must cooperate if A does not. In playing a game it believes to be chicken, B attempts to convince A that it will defect while at the same time it tries to determine whether A is more likely to cooperate or defect. This is a situation in which B should try particularly hard to determine A's true preferences. Even if the misperception continues, the search should at least suggest to B that A's commitment to defection is a strong one, thus inducing B's cooperation (result: DC). Thus, even if B is mistakenly playing chicken rather than one of the other three games, the outcome should be the same; B will concede as it becomes clear that A intends to defect. The misperception heightens tension in that the DD outcome will occur if B insists on defecting; but DC, the equilibrium outcome for the real game, typically emerges despite the misperception. Even if DD does occur, the misperception is only one part of the cause; it must be conjoined with B's obstinacy as well.
Finally, there is one other case of misperception that can occur. Actor B's preference orderings are the same in both leader and protector. Once again, B has no dominant strategy, but the two games do differ with respect to A's position. Protector refers to a relationship between allies in which A is B's protector. In this situation, A's dominant strategy is to defect, and B does not mind cooperating since it obtains its second-best outcome. Leader, also an alliance game, differs from protector in that A has no dominant strategy, and the two actors must coordinate their actions. If B mistakes a game of leader to be protector, then B is shortchanging itself by allowing A to defect and reap the benefits. The misperception provides B with its second-best outcome rather than the more preferred outcome it might have been able to achieve. In effect, the misperception solves the problem of coordination by leading actor B to forgo the possibility of the CD outcome and accept the DC outcome (both are equilibrium solutions).
The reverse misperception is more problematic. If B perceives the game to be leader when it is really protector, then B is in for a rude awakening if it attempts to lead by defecting. If B does defect, then it hurts itself by ensuring its own worst payoff and A's second-best one. This misperception occurs among allies when the weaker party thinks of itself as being on an equal footing with the stronger one. The result is that the misperceiving actor deprives itself of the protection of the stronger party, a relationship of which it has the greater need.
The role of misperception in international relations is thus quite different from that suggested by Snyder and Diesing and many other misperception theorists. Misperception may well be a common occurrence in international relations, and may often affect an actor's expectation of the probable outcome. But the assumption that misperception affects an actor's choice and thus changes a game's outcome does not always hold, for an actor's course of action only sometimes depends on its correct assessment of the other actor's intentions. In other words, misperception is often irrelevant to the cause and escalation of crisis and war. If the actors know that Snyder and Diesing's nine games exemplify the universe of crisis situations, then there are instances in which neither actor requires an accurate knowledge of the other's preferences. For actor A, five of the nine situations are uniquely defined by a knowledge of its own preferences; for B, three of the games are so defined. Further, when A does mistake one game for another because it misassesses B's intentions, its error does not lead it to change its course of action. In each of the possibly confused games, A has a dominant strategy; assuming that actors will always try to maximize their own returns, misperception will not lead any with a dominant strategy to alter their behavior. Only their expectations will be affected.
Misperception changes a strict maximizer's decision only when its choice is contingent on the other actor's choice. This situation arises for the row actor, A, in none of these nine key games. For the column actor, B, on the other hand, it is a problem. Ironically, however, B's misassessment of A's intentions does not always turn crisis into conflict. B's errors exacerbate conflict only between allies. If B misperceives its adversary, however, the mistake will facilitate coordination between the two actors and thus allow them to avoid war.
MUTUAL MISPERCEPTION
In addition to instances of a single actor's misperception of the other, it is also possible for both actors to misread the other's intentions. There are three configurations of such mutual misperceptions that can occur (see Figure io) . If both actors have a dominant strategy but believe that the other does not, misperception has no effect on their behavior or on the outcome, for each does what it would have done anyway. If neither has a dominant strategy but believes that the other does, their errors facilitate coordination. In this case, each will try to feel the other out. If both insist on getting their own way, the DD outcome may result; if each mistakes the other to have a dominant strategy, however, both are more likely to defer to the other, so that coordination will result.
The final class of. mutual misperception is one in which only one of the actors has a dominant strategy, and each believes that the other's strategy is like its own. The actor with the dominant strategy believes that the actor without one also has a dominant plan of action. Because it does not realize that the other actor's plans are not contingent on its own, it does not recognize the need to signal its true preferences. The actor without a dominant strategy, meanwhile, believes that the other actor also has contingent plans. This actor may try to get a better outcome by preempting the other player-behavior that seems to confirm the first player's misperception that the second actor also has a dominant strategy. This situation is ripe for disaster; here, misperception may become the sole cause of an otherwise avoidable war.
CONCLUSION
In the simplest terms, therefore, misperception need not cause conflict even when it does affect the actors' choices and behavior. Indeed, misperception can facilitate conflict avoidance, interactor coordination, and even mutual cooperation. For misperception to cause conflict, the misunderstood actor either must have a dominant strategy of defection or must be a tit-for-tat reciprocator. In either case, it will have no desire to mask its true preferences. Indeed, if the misperceived actor recognizes the other's confusion, its incentive is to signal its true preferences. Moreover, the misperceived actor's only incentive to deceive will be its desire to facilitate the avoidance of conflict.
Implicit in discussions of the impact of misperception are assumptions about what guides the decisions of misperceiving actors; the study of the implications of misperception thus requires the explicit formulation of these decision criteria. If the misperceiving actors are rational maximizers of their own returns, it is clear that misperception cannot affect the decision of an actor with a dominant strategy. In such situations, misperception can affect the actor's expectations, but not its actions or the outcome of the situation. Misperception only affects the decisions of an actor whose maximizing outcomes are contingent on the actions of another. Even then, when misperception affects an actor's decision and is a determinant of the outcome, it need not necessarily result in conflict.
One cannot, therefore, conclude that misperception causes conflict simply because it occurs in crises that result in war. Misperception may be coincidental to-rather than determinative of-the occurrence of war, because war can be an equilibrium outcome that results from specific configurations of actor preferences. Even if misperception does sometimes play a causal role in the outbreak of war, its impact is situationally circumscribed. It is certain, therefore, that if one limits the empirical study of misperception to crises that do result in war, one ensures an inaccurate assessment of the overall impact of misperception in international relations.
